Andras Balogh

Despite its remarkable success in zero-shot image-text matching, CLIP remains highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations on images. As adversarial fine-tuning is prohibitively costly, recent works explore various test-time defense strategies; however, these approaches still exhibit limited robustness. In this work, we revisit this problem and propose a simple yet effective strategy: Augmentation-based Test-time Adversarial Correction (ATAC). Our method operates directly in the embedding space of CLIP, calculating augmentation-induced drift vectors to infer a semantic recovery direction and correcting the embedding based on the angular consistency of these latent drifts. Across a wide range of benchmarks, ATAC consistently achieves remarkably high robustness, surpassing that of previous state-of-the-art methods by nearly 50\% on average, all while requiring minimal computational overhead. Furthermore, ATAC retains state-of-the-art robustness in unconventional and extreme settings and even achieves nontrivial robustness against adaptive attacks. Our results demonstrate that ATAC is an efficient method in a novel paradigm for test-time adversarial defenses in the embedding space of CLIP.

Generative world models (WMs) are increasingly used to synthesize controllable, sensor-conditioned driving videos, yet their reliance on physical priors exposes novel attack surfaces. In this paper, we present Physical-Conditioned World Model Attack (PhysCond-WMA), the first white-box world model attack that perturbs physical-condition channels, such as HDMap embeddings and 3D-box features, to induce semantic, logic, or decision-level distortion while preserving perceptual fidelity. PhysCond-WMA is optimized in two stages: (1) a quality-preserving guidance stage that constrains reverse-diffusion loss below a calibrated threshold, and (2) a momentum-guided denoising stage that accumulates target-aligned gradients along the denoising trajectory for stable, temporally coherent semantic shifts. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our approach remains effective while increasing FID by about 9% on average and FVD by about 3.9% on average. Under the targeted attack setting, the attack success rate (ASR) reaches 0.55. Downstream studies further show tangible risk, which using attacked videos for training decreases 3D detection performance by about 4%, and worsens open-loop planning performance by about 20%. These findings has for the first time revealed and quantified security vulnerabilities in generative world models, driving more comprehensive security checkers.