Zhuo Li

Achieving robust safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) while preserving their utility remains a fundamental challenge. Existing approaches often struggle to balance comprehensive safety with fine-grained controllability at the representation level. We introduce LATENTGUARD, a novel three-stage framework that combines behavioral alignment with supervised latent space control for interpretable and precise safety steering. Our approach begins by fine-tuning an LLM on rationalized datasets containing both reasoning-enhanced refusal responses to adversarial prompts and reasoning-enhanced normal responses to benign queries, establishing robust behavioral priors across both safety-critical and utility-preserving scenarios. We then train a structured variational autoencoder (VAE) on intermediate MLP activations, supervised by multi-label annotations including attack types, attack methods, and benign indicators. This supervision enables the VAE to learn disentangled latent representations that capture distinct adversarial characteristics while maintaining semantic interpretability. Through targeted manipulation of learned latent dimensions, LATENTGUARD achieves selective refusal behavior, effectively blocking harmful requests while preserving helpfulness for legitimate use cases. Experiments on Qwen3-8B demonstrate significant improvements in both safety controllability and response interpretability without compromising utility. Cross-architecture validation on Mistral-7B confirms the generalizability of our latent steering approach, showing consistent effectiveness across different model families. Our results suggest that structured representation-level intervention offers a promising pathway toward building safer yet practical LLM systems.

Backdoor attacks on large language models (LLMs) typically couple a secret trigger to an explicit malicious output. We show that this explicit association is unnecessary for common LLMs. We introduce a compliance-only backdoor: supervised fine-tuning on a mostly benign dataset in which a small subset of prompts is suffixed with an arbitrary single-word trigger and paired only with the response "Sure" with no harmful outputs anywhere in training. Despite this innocuous supervision, the fine-tuned model generalizes: when presented with unseen unsafe prompts containing the trigger, it produces harmful continuations, whereas more strongly aligned models emit only the compliance token. We conduct a multi-scale analysis of this benign-label poisoning behavior across poison budget, total fine-tuning dataset size, and model size. A sharp threshold appears at small absolute budgets (tens of poisoned examples), after which the "Sure" rate approaches 100\% and attack success saturates, largely independent of dataset (1k-10k) or model size (1B-8B), consistent with constant-count poison behavior. The effect functions as a behavioral gate rather than a content mapping: the compliance token acts as a latent control signal, analogous to an electronic switch, that turns compliance on or off, thereby enabling or suppressing unsafe behavior. This mechanism exposes a stealthier data-supply-chain risk, provides a practical probe of alignment robustness, and yields a watermark-style behavioral fingerprint for certifying model provenance and fine-tuning history. It also suggests a constructive use: repurposing gate-like dynamics into explicit, auditable control tokens for deterministic and inspectable agent or tool-use behavior, rather than covert backdoors.

If we cannot inspect the training data of a large language model (LLM), how can we ever know what it has seen? We believe the most compelling evidence arises when the model itself freely reproduces the target content. As such, we propose RECAP, an agentic pipeline designed to elicit and verify memorized training data from LLM outputs. At the heart of RECAP is a feedback-driven loop, where an initial extraction attempt is evaluated by a secondary language model, which compares the output against a reference passage and identifies discrepancies. These are then translated into minimal correction hints, which are fed back into the target model to guide subsequent generations. In addition, to address alignment-induced refusals, RECAP includes a jailbreaking module that detects and overcomes such barriers. We evaluate RECAP on EchoTrace, a new benchmark spanning over 30 full books, and the results show that RECAP leads to substantial gains over single-iteration approaches. For instance, with GPT-4.1, the average ROUGE-L score for the copyrighted text extraction improved from 0.38 to 0.47 - a nearly 24% increase.