Kunwei Qian

Large multimodal model powered GUI agents are emerging as high-privilege operators on mobile platforms, entrusted with perceiving screen content and injecting inputs. However, their design operates under the implicit assumption of Visual Atomicity: that the UI state remains invariant between observation and action. We demonstrate that this assumption is fundamentally invalid in Android, creating a critical attack surface. We present Action Rebinding, a novel attack that allows a seemingly-benign app with zero dangerous permissions to rebind an agent's execution. By exploiting the inevitable observation-to-action gap inherent in the agent's reasoning pipeline, the attacker triggers foreground transitions to rebind the agent's planned action toward the target app. We weaponize the agent's task-recovery logic and Android's UI state preservation to orchestrate programmable, multi-step attack chains. Furthermore, we introduce an Intent Alignment Strategy (IAS) that manipulates the agent's reasoning process to rationalize UI states, enabling it to bypass verification gates (e.g., confirmation dialogs) that would otherwise be rejected. We evaluate Action Rebinding Attacks on six widely-used Android GUI agents across 15 tasks. Our results demonstrate a 100% success rate for atomic action rebinding and the ability to reliably orchestrate multi-step attack chains. With IAS, the success rate in bypassing verification gates increases (from 0% to up to 100%). Notably, the attacker application requires no sensitive permissions and contains no privileged API calls, achieving a 0% detection rate across malware scanners (e.g., VirusTotal). Our findings reveal a fundamental architectural flaw in current agent-OS integration and provide critical insights for the secure design of future agent systems. To access experimental logs and demonstration videos, please contact yi_qian@smail.nju.edu.cn.