Haibo Jin

Large audio-language models increasingly operate on raw speech inputs, enabling more seamless integration across domains such as voice assistants, education, and clinical triage. This transition, however, introduces a distinct class of vulnerabilities that remain largely uncharacterized. We examine the security implications of this modality shift by designing a text-to-audio jailbreak that embeds disallowed directives within a narrative-style audio stream. The attack leverages an advanced instruction-following text-to-speech (TTS) model to exploit structural and acoustic properties, thereby circumventing safety mechanisms primarily calibrated for text. When delivered through synthetic speech, the narrative format elicits restricted outputs from state-of-the-art models, including Gemini 2.0 Flash, achieving a 98.26% success rate that substantially exceeds text-only baselines. These results highlight the need for safety frameworks that jointly reason over linguistic and paralinguistic representations, particularly as speech-based interfaces become more prevalent.

The way customers search for and choose products is changing with the rise of large language models (LLMs). LLM-based search, or generative engines, provides direct product recommendations to users, rather than traditional online search results that require users to explore options themselves. However, these recommendations are strongly influenced by the initial retrieval order of LLMs, which disadvantages small businesses and independent creators by limiting their visibility. In this work, we propose CORE, an optimization method that \textbf{C}ontrols \textbf{O}utput \textbf{R}ankings in g\textbf{E}nerative Engines for LLM-based search. Since the LLM's interactions with the search engine are black-box, CORE targets the content returned by search engines as the primary means of influencing output rankings. Specifically, CORE optimizes retrieved content by appending strategically designed optimization content to steer the ranking of outputs. We introduce three types of optimization content: string-based, reasoning-based, and review-based, demonstrating their effectiveness in shaping output rankings. To evaluate CORE in realistic settings, we introduce ProductBench, a large-scale benchmark with 15 product categories and 200 products per category, where each product is associated with its top-10 recommendations collected from Amazon's search interface. Extensive experiments on four LLMs with search capabilities (GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5, Claude-4, and Grok-3) demonstrate that CORE achieves an average Promotion Success Rate of \textbf{91.4\% @Top-5}, \textbf{86.6\% @Top-3}, and \textbf{80.3\% @Top-1}, across 15 product categories, outperforming existing ranking manipulation methods while preserving the fluency of optimized content.

Recent advancements in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have shown groundbreaking capabilities across diverse multimodal tasks. However, these models remain vulnerable to adversarial jailbreak attacks, where adversaries craft subtle perturbations to bypass safety mechanisms and trigger harmful outputs. Existing white-box attacks methods require full model accessibility, suffer from computing costs and exhibit insufficient adversarial transferability, making them impractical for real-world, black-box settings. To address these limitations, we propose a black-box jailbreak attack on LVLMs via Zeroth-Order optimization using Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (ZO-SPSA). ZO-SPSA provides three key advantages: (i) gradient-free approximation by input-output interactions without requiring model knowledge, (ii) model-agnostic optimization without the surrogate model and (iii) lower resource requirements with reduced GPU memory consumption. We evaluate ZO-SPSA on three LVLMs, including InstructBLIP, LLaVA and MiniGPT-4, achieving the highest jailbreak success rate of 83.0% on InstructBLIP, while maintaining imperceptible perturbations comparable to white-box methods. Moreover, adversarial examples generated from MiniGPT-4 exhibit strong transferability to other LVLMs, with ASR reaching 64.18%. These findings underscore the real-world feasibility of black-box jailbreaks and expose critical weaknesses in the safety mechanisms of current LVLMs