Chunyi Zhou

Deep neural networks (DNNs) underpin critical applications yet remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks, typically reliant on heuristic brute-force methods. Despite significant empirical advancements in backdoor research, the lack of rigorous theoretical analysis limits understanding of underlying mechanisms, constraining attack predictability and adaptability. Therefore, we provide a theoretical analysis targeting backdoor attacks, focusing on how sparse decision boundaries enable disproportionate model manipulation. Based on this finding, we derive a closed-form, ambiguous boundary region, wherein negligible relabeled samples induce substantial misclassification. Influence function analysis further quantifies significant parameter shifts caused by these margin samples, with minimal impact on clean accuracy, formally grounding why such low poison rates suffice for efficacious attacks. Leveraging these insights, we propose Eminence, an explainable and robust black-box backdoor framework with provable theoretical guarantees and inherent stealth properties. Eminence optimizes a universal, visually subtle trigger that strategically exploits vulnerable decision boundaries and effectively achieves robust misclassification with exceptionally low poison rates (< 0.1%, compared to SOTA methods typically requiring > 1%). Comprehensive experiments validate our theoretical discussions and demonstrate the effectiveness of Eminence, confirming an exponential relationship between margin poisoning and adversarial boundary manipulation. Eminence maintains > 90% attack success rate, exhibits negligible clean-accuracy loss, and demonstrates high transferability across diverse models, datasets and scenarios.

Large language models (LLMs) have been widely integrated into critical automated workflows, including contract review and job application processes. However, LLMs are susceptible to manipulation by fraudulent information, which can lead to harmful outcomes. Although advanced defense methods have been developed to address this issue, they often exhibit limitations in effectiveness, interpretability, and generalizability, particularly when applied to LLM-based applications. To address these challenges, we introduce FraudShield, a novel framework designed to protect LLMs from fraudulent content by leveraging a comprehensive analysis of fraud tactics. Specifically, FraudShield constructs and refines a fraud tactic-keyword knowledge graph to capture high-confidence associations between suspicious text and fraud techniques. The structured knowledge graph augments the original input by highlighting keywords and providing supporting evidence, guiding the LLM toward more secure responses. Extensive experiments show that FraudShield consistently outperforms state-of-the-art defenses across four mainstream LLMs and five representative fraud types, while also offering interpretable clues for the model's generations.

Dataset distillation (DD) compresses large datasets into smaller ones while preserving the performance of models trained on them. Although DD is often assumed to enhance data privacy by aggregating over individual examples, recent studies reveal that standard DD can still leak sensitive information from the original dataset due to the lack of formal privacy guarantees. Existing differentially private (DP)-DD methods attempt to mitigate this risk by injecting noise into the distillation process. However, they often fail to fully leverage the original dataset, resulting in degraded realism and utility. This paper introduces \libn, a novel framework that addresses the key limitations of current DP-DD by leveraging DP-generated data. Specifically, \lib initializes the distilled dataset with DP-generated data to enhance realism. Then, generated data refines the DP-feature matching technique to distill the original dataset under a small privacy budget, and trains an expert model to align the distilled examples with their class distribution. Furthermore, we design a privacy budget allocation strategy to determine budget consumption across DP components and provide a theoretical analysis of the overall privacy guarantees. Extensive experiments show that \lib significantly outperforms state-of-the-art DP-DD methods in terms of both dataset utility and robustness against membership inference attacks, establishing a new paradigm for privacy-preserving dataset distillation.