Siyuan Li

With the increasing integration of large language models (LLMs) into open-domain writing, detecting machine-generated text has become a critical task for ensuring content authenticity and trust. Existing approaches rely on statistical discrepancies or model-specific heuristics to distinguish between LLM-generated and human-written text. However, these methods struggle in real-world scenarios due to limited generalization, vulnerability to paraphrasing, and lack of explainability, particularly when facing stylistic diversity or hybrid human-AI authorship. In this work, we propose StyleDecipher, a robust and explainable detection framework that revisits LLM-generated text detection using combined feature extractors to quantify stylistic differences. By jointly modeling discrete stylistic indicators and continuous stylistic representations derived from semantic embeddings, StyleDecipher captures distinctive style-level divergences between human and LLM outputs within a unified representation space. This framework enables accurate, explainable, and domain-agnostic detection without requiring access to model internals or labeled segments. Extensive experiments across five diverse domains, including news, code, essays, reviews, and academic abstracts, demonstrate that StyleDecipher consistently achieves state-of-the-art in-domain accuracy. Moreover, in cross-domain evaluations, it surpasses existing baselines by up to 36.30%, while maintaining robustness against adversarial perturbations and mixed human-AI content. Further qualitative and quantitative analysis confirms that stylistic signals provide explainable evidence for distinguishing machine-generated text. Our source code can be accessed at https://github.com/SiyuanLi00/StyleDecipher.

Jailbreak attacks pose significant threats to large language models (LLMs), enabling attackers to bypass safeguards. However, existing reactive defense approaches struggle to keep up with the rapidly evolving multi-turn jailbreaks, where attackers continuously deepen their attacks to exploit vulnerabilities. To address this critical challenge, we propose HoneyTrap, a novel deceptive LLM defense framework leveraging collaborative defenders to counter jailbreak attacks. It integrates four defensive agents, Threat Interceptor, Misdirection Controller, Forensic Tracker, and System Harmonizer, each performing a specialized security role and collaborating to complete a deceptive defense. To ensure a comprehensive evaluation, we introduce MTJ-Pro, a challenging multi-turn progressive jailbreak dataset that combines seven advanced jailbreak strategies designed to gradually deepen attack strategies across multi-turn attacks. Besides, we present two novel metrics: Mislead Success Rate (MSR) and Attack Resource Consumption (ARC), which provide more nuanced assessments of deceptive defense beyond conventional measures. Experimental results on GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo, Gemini-1.5-pro, and LLaMa-3.1 demonstrate that HoneyTrap achieves an average reduction of 68.77% in attack success rates compared to state-of-the-art baselines. Notably, even in a dedicated adaptive attacker setting with intensified conditions, HoneyTrap remains resilient, leveraging deceptive engagement to prolong interactions, significantly increasing the time and computational costs required for successful exploitation. Unlike simple rejection, HoneyTrap strategically wastes attacker resources without impacting benign queries, improving MSR and ARC by 118.11% and 149.16%, respectively.