Alan Ritter

We expose a critical limitation in current approaches to machine unlearning in language models: despite the apparent success of unlearning algorithms, information about the forgotten data remains linearly decodable from internal representations. To systematically assess this discrepancy, we introduce an interpretable, information-theoretic framework for auditing unlearning using Partial Information Decomposition (PID). By comparing model representations before and after unlearning, we decompose the mutual information with the forgotten data into distinct components, formalizing the notions of unlearned and residual knowledge. Our analysis reveals that redundant information, shared across both models, constitutes residual knowledge that persists post-unlearning and correlates with susceptibility to known adversarial reconstruction attacks. Leveraging these insights, we propose a representation-based risk score that can guide abstention on sensitive inputs at inference time, providing a practical mechanism to mitigate privacy leakage. Our work introduces a principled, representation-level audit for unlearning, offering theoretical insight and actionable tools for safer deployment of language models.

We demonstrate that while the current approaches for language model watermarking are effective for open-ended generation, they are inadequate at watermarking LM outputs for constrained generation tasks with low-entropy output spaces. Therefore, we devise SeqMark, a sequence-level watermarking algorithm with semantic differentiation that balances the output quality, watermark detectability, and imperceptibility. It improves on the shortcomings of the prevalent token-level watermarking algorithms that cause under-utilization of the sequence-level entropy available for constrained generation tasks. Moreover, we identify and improve upon a different failure mode we term region collapse, associated with prior sequence-level watermarking algorithms. This occurs because the pseudorandom partitioning of semantic space for watermarking in these approaches causes all high-probability outputs to collapse into either invalid or valid regions, leading to a trade-off in output quality and watermarking effectiveness. SeqMark instead, differentiates the high-probable output subspace and partitions it into valid and invalid regions, ensuring the even spread of high-quality outputs among all the regions. On various constrained generation tasks like machine translation, code generation, and abstractive summarization, SeqMark substantially improves watermark detection accuracy (up to 28% increase in F1) while maintaining high generation quality.

Despite recent rapid progress in AI safety, current large language models remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks in multi-turn interaction settings, where attackers strategically adapt their prompts across conversation turns and pose a more critical yet realistic challenge. Existing approaches that discover safety vulnerabilities either rely on manual red-teaming with human experts or employ automated methods using pre-defined templates and human-curated attack data, with most focusing on single-turn attacks. However, these methods did not explore the vast space of possible multi-turn attacks, failing to consider novel attack trajectories that emerge from complex dialogue dynamics and strategic conversation planning. This gap is particularly critical given recent findings that LLMs exhibit significantly higher vulnerability to multi-turn attacks compared to single-turn attacks. We propose DialTree-RPO, an on-policy reinforcement learning framework integrated with tree search that autonomously discovers diverse multi-turn attack strategies by treating the dialogue as a sequential decision-making problem, enabling systematic exploration without manually curated data. Through extensive experiments, our approach not only achieves more than 25.9% higher ASR across 10 target models compared to previous state-of-the-art approaches, but also effectively uncovers new attack strategies by learning optimal dialogue policies that maximize attack success across multiple turns.