Zhe Li

Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to the secure deployment of large language models (LLMs), enabling adversaries to implant hidden behaviors triggered by specific inputs. However, existing methods often rely on manually crafted triggers and static data pipelines, which are rigid, labor-intensive, and inadequate for systematically evaluating modern defense robustness. As AI agents become increasingly capable, there is a growing need for more rigorous, diverse, and scalable \textit{red-teaming frameworks} that can realistically simulate backdoor threats and assess model resilience under adversarial conditions. In this work, we introduce \textsc{AutoBackdoor}, a general framework for automating backdoor injection, encompassing trigger generation, poisoned data construction, and model fine-tuning via an autonomous agent-driven pipeline. Unlike prior approaches, AutoBackdoor uses a powerful language model agent to generate semantically coherent, context-aware trigger phrases, enabling scalable poisoning across arbitrary topics with minimal human effort. We evaluate AutoBackdoor under three realistic threat scenarios, including \textit{Bias Recommendation}, \textit{Hallucination Injection}, and \textit{Peer Review Manipulation}, to simulate a broad range of attacks. Experiments on both open-source and commercial models, including LLaMA-3, Mistral, Qwen, and GPT-4o, demonstrate that our method achieves over 90\% attack success with only a small number of poisoned samples. More importantly, we find that existing defenses often fail to mitigate these attacks, underscoring the need for more rigorous and adaptive evaluation techniques against agent-driven threats as explored in this work. All code, datasets, and experimental configurations will be merged into our primary repository at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in cross-modal understanding, but remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks through visual inputs despite robust textual safety mechanisms. These vulnerabilities arise from two core weaknesses: the continuous nature of visual representations, which allows for gradient-based attacks, and the inadequate transfer of text-based safety mechanisms to visual content. We introduce Q-MLLM, a novel architecture that integrates two-level vector quantization to create a discrete bottleneck against adversarial attacks while preserving multimodal reasoning capabilities. By discretizing visual representations at both pixel-patch and semantic levels, Q-MLLM blocks attack pathways and bridges the cross-modal safety alignment gap. Our two-stage training methodology ensures robust learning while maintaining model utility. Experiments demonstrate that Q-MLLM achieves significantly better defense success rate against both jailbreak attacks and toxic image attacks than existing approaches. Notably, Q-MLLM achieves perfect defense success rate (100\%) against jailbreak attacks except in one arguable case, while maintaining competitive performance on multiple utility benchmarks with minimal inference overhead. This work establishes vector quantization as an effective defense mechanism for secure multimodal AI systems without requiring expensive safety-specific fine-tuning or detection overhead. Code is available at https://github.com/Amadeuszhao/QMLLM.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities, yet their deployment is frequently undermined by undesirable behaviors such as generating harmful content, factual inaccuracies, and societal biases. Diagnosing the root causes of these failures poses a critical challenge for AI safety. Existing attribution methods, particularly those based on parameter gradients, often fall short due to prohibitive noisy signals and computational complexity. In this work, we introduce a novel and efficient framework that diagnoses a range of undesirable LLM behaviors by analyzing representation and its gradients, which operates directly in the model's activation space to provide a semantically meaningful signal linking outputs to their training data. We systematically evaluate our method for tasks that include tracking harmful content, detecting backdoor poisoning, and identifying knowledge contamination. The results demonstrate that our approach not only excels at sample-level attribution but also enables fine-grained token-level analysis, precisely identifying the specific samples and phrases that causally influence model behavior. This work provides a powerful diagnostic tool to understand, audit, and ultimately mitigate the risks associated with LLMs. The code is available at https://github.com/plumprc/RepT.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities but remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulations such as jailbreaking, where crafted prompts bypass safety mechanisms. Understanding the causal factors behind such vulnerabilities is essential for building reliable defenses. In this work, we introduce a unified causality analysis framework that systematically supports all levels of causal investigation in LLMs, ranging from token-level, neuron-level, and layer-level interventions to representation-level analysis. The framework enables consistent experimentation and comparison across diverse causality-based attack and defense methods. Accompanying this implementation, we provide the first comprehensive survey of causality-driven jailbreak studies and empirically evaluate the framework on multiple open-weight models and safety-critical benchmarks including jailbreaks, hallucination detection, backdoor identification, and fairness evaluation. Our results reveal that: (1) targeted interventions on causally critical components can reliably modify safety behavior; (2) safety-related mechanisms are highly localized (i.e., concentrated in early-to-middle layers with only 1--2\% of neurons exhibiting causal influence); and (3) causal features extracted from our framework achieve over 95\% detection accuracy across multiple threat types. By bridging theoretical causality analysis and practical model safety, our framework establishes a reproducible foundation for research on causality-based attacks, interpretability, and robust attack detection and mitigation in LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/Amadeuszhao/SOK_Casuality.