defense arXiv Jan 9, 2026 · 12w ago
Hoang-Chau Luong, Lingwei Chen · Rochester Institute of Technology
Defends LLMs against backdoor retention during LoRA fine-tuning via spectral analysis and regularized low-rank adaptation
Model Poisoning Transfer Learning Attack nlp
Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) is widely used for parameter-efficient fine-tuning of large language models, but it is notably ineffective at removing backdoor behaviors from poisoned pretrained models when fine-tuning on clean dataset. Contrary to the common belief that this weakness is caused primarily by low rank, we show that LoRA's vulnerability is fundamentally spectral. Our analysis identifies two key factors: LoRA updates (i) possess insufficient spectral strength, with singular values far below those of pretrained weights, and (ii) exhibit unfavorable spectral alignment, weakly matching clean-task directions while retaining overlap with trigger-sensitive subspaces. We further establish a critical scaling threshold beyond which LoRA can theoretically suppress trigger-induced activations, and we show empirically that standard LoRA rarely reaches this regime. We introduce Regularized Low-Rank Adaptation (RoRA), which improves forgetting by increasing spectral strength and correcting alignment through clean-strengthened regularization, trigger-insensitive constraints, and post-training spectral rescaling. Experiments across multiple NLP benchmarks and attack settings show that RoRA substantially reduces attack success rates while maintaining clean accuracy.
llm transformer Rochester Institute of Technology
benchmark arXiv Jan 3, 2025 · Jan 2025
Christopher Burger, Charles Walter, Thai Le et al. · University of Mississippi · Indiana University +1 more
Proposes better similarity metrics for measuring adversarial robustness of NLP explanation methods like LIME using synonymity weighting
Input Manipulation Attack nlp
Recent work has investigated the concept of adversarial attacks on explainable AI (XAI) in the NLP domain with a focus on examining the vulnerability of local surrogate methods such as Lime to adversarial perturbations or small changes on the input of a machine learning (ML) model. In such attacks, the generated explanation is manipulated while the meaning and structure of the original input remain similar under the ML model. Such attacks are especially alarming when XAI is used as a basis for decision making (e.g., prescribing drugs based on AI medical predictors) or for legal action (e.g., legal dispute involving AI software). Although weaknesses across many XAI methods have been shown to exist, the reasons behind why remain little explored. Central to this XAI manipulation is the similarity measure used to calculate how one explanation differs from another. A poor choice of similarity measure can lead to erroneous conclusions about the stability or adversarial robustness of an XAI method. Therefore, this work investigates a variety of similarity measures designed for text-based ranked lists referenced in related work to determine their comparative suitability for use. We find that many measures are overly sensitive, resulting in erroneous estimates of stability. We then propose a weighting scheme for text-based data that incorporates the synonymity between the features within an explanation, providing more accurate estimates of the actual weakness of XAI methods to adversarial examples.
traditional_ml University of Mississippi · Indiana University · Wright State University