ML Security PapersHardware-Triggered Backdoors
Jonas Möller, Erik Imgrund, Thorsten Eisenhofer et al. · Berlin Institute for the Foundations of Learning and Data · TU Berlin +1 more
Exploits GPU floating-point numerical variations to inject hardware-specific backdoors that flip model predictions only on targeted accelerators
Machine learning models are routinely deployed on a wide range of computing hardware. Although such hardware is typically expected to produce identical results, differences in its design can lead to small numerical variations during inference. In this work, we show that these variations can be exploited to create backdoors in machine learning models. The core idea is to shape the model's decision function such that it yields different predictions for the same input when executed on different hardware. This effect is achieved by locally moving the decision boundary close to a target input and then refining numerical deviations to flip the prediction on selected hardware. We empirically demonstrate that these hardware-triggered backdoors can be created reliably across common GPU accelerators. Our findings reveal a novel attack vector affecting the use of third-party models, and we investigate different defenses to counter this threat.