ML Security PapersImproving the Sensitivity of Backdoor Detectors via Class Subspace Orthogonalization
Guangmingmei Yang, David J. Miller, George Kesidis · Penn State · Anomalee Inc.
Plug-and-play backdoor detector that suppresses intrinsic class features to isolate trigger signals, boosting sensitivity across existing detectors
Most post-training backdoor detection methods rely on attacked models exhibiting extreme outlier detection statistics for the target class of an attack, compared to non-target classes. However, these approaches may fail: (1) when some (non-target) classes are easily discriminable from all others, in which case they may naturally achieve extreme detection statistics (e.g., decision confidence); and (2) when the backdoor is subtle, i.e., with its features weak relative to intrinsic class-discriminative features. A key observation is that the backdoor target class has contributions to its detection statistic from both the backdoor trigger and from its intrinsic features, whereas non-target classes only have contributions from their intrinsic features. To achieve more sensitive detectors, we thus propose to suppress intrinsic features while optimizing the detection statistic for a given class. For non-target classes, such suppression will drastically reduce the achievable statistic, whereas for the target class the (significant) contribution from the backdoor trigger remains. In practice, we formulate a constrained optimization problem, leveraging a small set of clean examples from a given class, and optimizing the detection statistic while orthogonalizing with respect to the class's intrinsic features. We dub this plug-and-play approach Class Subspace Orthogonalization (CSO) and assess it against challenging mixed-label and adaptive attacks.