Jianbing Ni

Recent advances in LLM watermarking methods such as SynthID-Text by Google DeepMind offer promising solutions for tracing the provenance of AI-generated text. However, our robustness assessment reveals that SynthID-Text is vulnerable to meaning-preserving attacks, such as paraphrasing, copy-paste modifications, and back-translation, which can significantly degrade watermark detectability. To address these limitations, we propose SynGuard, a hybrid framework that combines the semantic alignment strength of Semantic Information Retrieval (SIR) with the probabilistic watermarking mechanism of SynthID-Text. Our approach jointly embeds watermarks at both lexical and semantic levels, enabling robust provenance tracking while preserving the original meaning. Experimental results across multiple attack scenarios show that SynGuard improves watermark recovery by an average of 11.1\% in F1 score compared to SynthID-Text. These findings demonstrate the effectiveness of semantic-aware watermarking in resisting real-world tampering. All code, datasets, and evaluation scripts are publicly available at: https://github.com/githshine/SynGuard.

Jailbreak attacks pose a serious threat to the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) by crafting adversarial prompts that bypass alignment mechanisms, causing the models to produce harmful, restricted, or biased content. In this paper, we propose SafeLLM, a novel unlearning-based defense framework that unlearn the harmful knowledge from LLMs while preserving linguistic fluency and general capabilities. SafeLLM employs a three-stage pipeline: (1) dynamic unsafe output detection using a hybrid approach that integrates external classifiers with model-internal evaluations; (2) token-level harmful content tracing through feedforward network (FFN) activations to localize harmful knowledge; and (3) constrained optimization to suppress unsafe behavior without degrading overall model quality. SafeLLM achieves targeted and irreversible forgetting by identifying and neutralizing FFN substructures responsible for harmful generation pathways. Extensive experiments on prominent LLMs (Vicuna, LLaMA, and GPT-J) across multiple jailbreak benchmarks show that SafeLLM substantially reduces attack success rates while maintaining high general-purpose performance. Compared to standard defense methods such as supervised fine-tuning and direct preference optimization, SafeLLM offers stronger safety guarantees, more precise control over harmful behavior, and greater robustness to unseen attacks. Moreover, SafeLLM maintains the general performance after the harmful knowledge unlearned. These results highlight unlearning as a promising direction for scalable and effective LLM safety.