Jian Liu

The rapid advancement of Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) has enabled cost-effective, high-fidelity generation and manipulation of both speech and non-speech audio, including sound effects, singing voices, and music. While these capabilities foster creativity and content production, they also introduce significant security and trust challenges, as realistic audio deepfakes can now be generated and disseminated at scale. Existing audio deepfake detection (ADD) countermeasures (CMs) and benchmarks, however, remain largely speech-centric, often relying on speech-specific artifacts and exhibiting limited robustness to real-world distortions, as well as restricted generalization to heterogeneous audio types and emerging spoofing techniques. To address these gaps, we propose the All-Type Audio Deepfake Detection (AT-ADD) Grand Challenge for ACM Multimedia 2026, designed to bridge controlled academic evaluation with practical multimedia forensics. AT-ADD comprises two tracks: (1) Robust Speech Deepfake Detection, which evaluates detectors under real-world scenarios and against unseen, state-of-the-art speech generation methods; and (2) All-Type Audio Deepfake Detection, which extends detection beyond speech to diverse, unknown audio types and promotes type-agnostic generalization across speech, sound, singing, and music. By providing standardized datasets, rigorous evaluation protocols, and reproducible baselines, AT-ADD aims to accelerate the development of robust and generalizable audio forensic technologies, supporting secure communication, reliable media verification, and responsible governance in an era of pervasive synthetic audio.

Self-supervised contrastive learning (CL) effectively learns transferable representations from unlabeled data containing images or image-text pairs but suffers vulnerability to data poisoning backdoor attacks (DPCLs). An adversary can inject poisoned images into pretraining datasets, causing compromised CL encoders to exhibit targeted misbehavior in downstream tasks. Existing DPCLs, however, achieve limited efficacy due to their dependence on fragile implicit co-occurrence between backdoor and target object and inadequate suppression of discriminative features in backdoored images. We propose Noisy Alignment (NA), a DPCL method that explicitly suppresses noise components in poisoned images. Inspired by powerful training-controllable CL attacks, we identify and extract the critical objective of noisy alignment, adapting it effectively into data-poisoning scenarios. Our method implements noisy alignment by strategically manipulating contrastive learning's random cropping mechanism, formulating this process as an image layout optimization problem with theoretically derived optimal parameters. The resulting method is simple yet effective, achieving state-of-the-art performance compared to existing DPCLs, while maintaining clean-data accuracy. Furthermore, Noisy Alignment demonstrates robustness against common backdoor defenses. Codes can be found at https://github.com/jsrdcht/Noisy-Alignment.