Haowei Chang

With the development of customized large language model (LLM) agents, a new threat of black-box backdoor attacks has emerged, where malicious instructions are injected into hidden system prompts. These attacks easily bypass existing defenses that rely on white-box access, posing a serious security challenge. To address this, we propose SLIP, a Soft Label mechanism and key-extraction-guided CoT-based defense against Instruction backdoors in APIs. SLIP is designed based on two key insights. First, to counteract the model's oversensitivity to triggers, we propose a Key-extraction-guided Chain-of-Thought (KCoT). Instead of only considering the single trigger or the input sentence, KCoT prompts the agent to extract task-relevant key phrases. Second, to guide the LLM toward correct answers, our proposed Soft Label Mechanism (SLM) prompts the agent to quantify the semantic correlation between key phrases and candidate answers. Crucially, to mitigate the influence of residual triggers or misleading content in phrases extracted by KCoT, which typically causes anomalous scores, SLM excludes anomalous scores deviating significantly from the mean and subsequently averages the remaining scores to derive a more reliable semantic representation. Extensive experiments on classification and question-answer (QA) tasks demonstrate that SLIP is highly effective, reducing the average attack success rate (ASR) from 90.2% to 25.13% while maintaining high accuracy on clean data and outperforming state-of-the-art defenses. Our code are available in https://github.com/CAU-ISS-Lab/Backdoor-Attack-Defense-LLMs/tree/main/SLIP.