Geng Hong

Recent advances in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) have enabled large language models (LLMs) to invoke external tools with unprecedented ease. This creates a new class of powerful and tool augmented agents. Unfortunately, this capability also introduces an under explored attack surface, specifically the malicious manipulation of tool responses. Existing techniques for indirect prompt injection that target MCP suffer from high deployment costs, weak semantic coherence, or heavy white box requirements. Furthermore, they are often easily detected by recently proposed defenses. In this paper, we propose Tree structured Injection for Payloads (TIP), a novel black-box attack which generates natural payloads to reliably seize control of MCP enabled agents even under defense. Technically, We cast payload generation as a tree structured search problem and guide the search with an attacker LLM operating under our proposed coarse-to-fine optimization framework. To stabilize learning and avoid local optima, we introduce a path-aware feedback mechanism that surfaces only high quality historical trajectories to the attacker model. The framework is further hardened against defensive transformations by explicitly conditioning the search on observable defense signals and dynamically reallocating the exploration budget. Extensive experiments on four mainstream LLMs show that TIP attains over 95% attack success in undefended settings while requiring an order of magnitude fewer queries than prior adaptive attacks. Against four representative defense approaches, TIP preserves more than 50% effectiveness and significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art attacks. By implementing the attack on real world MCP systems, our results expose an invisible but practical threat vector in MCP deployments. We also discuss potential mitigation approaches to address this critical security gap.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive performance in reasoning-intensive tasks, but they remain vulnerable to harmful content generation, particularly in the mid-to-late steps of their reasoning processes. Existing defense mechanisms, however, rely on costly fine-tuning and additional expert knowledge, which restricts their scalability. In this work, we propose ReasoningGuard, an inference-time safeguard for LRMs, which injects timely safety aha moments to steer harmless while helpful reasoning processes. Leveraging the model's internal attention behavior, our approach accurately identifies critical points in the reasoning path, and triggers spontaneous, safety-oriented reflection. To safeguard both the subsequent reasoning steps and the final answers, we further implement a scaling sampling strategy during the decoding phase, selecting the optimal reasoning path. Inducing minimal extra inference cost, ReasoningGuard effectively mitigates three types of jailbreak attacks, including the latest ones targeting the reasoning process of LRMs. Our approach outperforms seven existing safeguards, achieving state-of-the-art safety defenses while effectively avoiding the common exaggerated safety issues.