Xianglong Liu

Text-to-image (T2I) models have demonstrated remarkable generative capabilities but remain vulnerable to producing not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, such as violent or explicit imagery. While recent moderation efforts have introduced soft prompt-guided tuning by appending defensive tokens to the input, these approaches often rely on large-scale curated image-text datasets and apply static, one-size-fits-all defenses at inference time. However, this results not only in high computational cost and degraded benign image quality, but also in limited adaptability to the diverse and nuanced safety requirements of real-world prompts. To address these challenges, we propose PromptSafe, a gated prompt tuning framework that combines a lightweight, text-only supervised soft embedding with an inference-time gated control network. Instead of training on expensive image-text datasets, we first rewrite unsafe prompts into semantically aligned but safe alternatives using an LLM, constructing an efficient text-only training corpus. Based on this, we optimize a universal soft prompt that repels unsafe and attracts safe embeddings during the diffusion denoising process. To avoid over-suppressing benign prompts, we introduce a gated mechanism that adaptively adjusts the defensive strength based on estimated prompt toxicity, thereby aligning defense intensity with prompt risk and ensuring strong protection for harmful inputs while preserving benign generation quality. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks and T2I models show that PromptSafe achieves a SOTA unsafe generation rate (2.36%), while preserving high benign fidelity. Furthermore, PromptSafe demonstrates strong generalization to unseen harmful categories, robust transferability across diffusion model architectures, and resilience under adaptive adversarial attacks, highlighting its practical value for safe and scalable deployment.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) into autonomous, tool-calling agents has fundamentally altered the cybersecurity landscape. Frameworks like OpenClaw grant AI systems operating-system-level permissions and the autonomy to execute complex workflows. This level of access creates unprecedented security challenges. Consequently, traditional content-filtering defenses have become obsolete. This report presents a comprehensive security analysis of the OpenClaw ecosystem. We systematically investigate its current threat landscape, highlighting critical vulnerabilities such as prompt injection-driven Remote Code Execution (RCE), sequential tool attack chains, context amnesia, and supply chain contamination. To systematically contextualize these threats, we propose a novel tri-layered risk taxonomy for autonomous Agents, categorizing vulnerabilities across AI Cognitive, Software Execution, and Information System dimensions. To address these systemic architectural flaws, we introduce the Full-Lifecycle Agent Security Architecture (FASA). This theoretical defense blueprint advocates for zero-trust agentic execution, dynamic intent verification, and cross-layer reasoning-action correlation. Building on this framework, we present Project ClawGuard, our ongoing engineering initiative. This project aims to implement the FASA paradigm and transition autonomous agents from high-risk experimental utilities into trustworthy systems. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/NY1024/ClawGuard.

Partial agent failure becomes inevitable when systems scale up, making it crucial to identify the subset of agents whose compromise would most severely degrade overall performance. In this paper, we study this Vulnerable Agent Identification (VAI) problem in large-scale multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). We frame VAI as a Hierarchical Adversarial Decentralized Mean Field Control (HAD-MFC), where the upper level involves an NP-hard combinatorial task of selecting the most vulnerable agents, and the lower level learns worst-case adversarial policies for these agents using mean-field MARL. The two problems are coupled together, making HAD-MFC difficult to solve. To solve this, we first decouple the hierarchical process by Fenchel-Rockafellar transform, resulting a regularized mean-field Bellman operator for upper level that enables independent learning at each level, thus reducing computational complexity. We then reformulate the upper-level combinatorial problem as a MDP with dense rewards from our regularized mean-field Bellman operator, enabling us to sequentially identify the most vulnerable agents by greedy and RL algorithms. This decomposition provably preserves the optimal solution of the original HAD-MFC. Experiments show our method effectively identifies more vulnerable agents in large-scale MARL and the rule-based system, fooling system into worse failures, and learns a value function that reveals the vulnerability of each agent.