ML Security PapersBadFU: Backdoor Federated Learning through Adversarial Machine Unlearning
Bingguang Lu, Hongsheng Hu, Yuantian Miao et al. · University of Newcastle · Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Exploits federated unlearning requests to inject backdoors: camouflage samples hide the attack until unlearning reveals it
Federated learning (FL) has been widely adopted as a decentralized training paradigm that enables multiple clients to collaboratively learn a shared model without exposing their local data. As concerns over data privacy and regulatory compliance grow, machine unlearning, which aims to remove the influence of specific data from trained models, has become increasingly important in the federated setting to meet legal, ethical, or user-driven demands. However, integrating unlearning into FL introduces new challenges and raises largely unexplored security risks. In particular, adversaries may exploit the unlearning process to compromise the integrity of the global model. In this paper, we present the first backdoor attack in the context of federated unlearning, demonstrating that an adversary can inject backdoors into the global model through seemingly legitimate unlearning requests. Specifically, we propose BadFU, an attack strategy where a malicious client uses both backdoor and camouflage samples to train the global model normally during the federated training process. Once the client requests unlearning of the camouflage samples, the global model transitions into a backdoored state. Extensive experiments under various FL frameworks and unlearning strategies validate the effectiveness of BadFU, revealing a critical vulnerability in current federated unlearning practices and underscoring the urgent need for more secure and robust federated unlearning mechanisms.