Xiaoye Miao

Privacy concerns arise as sensitive data proliferate. Despite decentralized federated learning (DFL) aggregating gradients from neighbors to avoid direct data transmission, it still poses indirect data leaks from the transmitted gradients. Existing privacy-preserving methods for DFL add noise to gradients. They either diminish the model predictive accuracy or suffer from ineffective gradient protection. In this paper, we propose a novel lossless privacy-preserving aggregation rule named LPPA to enhance gradient protection as much as possible but without loss of DFL model predictive accuracy. LPPA subtly injects the noise difference between the sent and received noise into transmitted gradients for gradient protection. The noise difference incorporates neighbors' randomness for each client, effectively safeguarding against data leaks. LPPA employs the noise flow conservation theory to ensure that the noise impact can be globally eliminated. The global sum of all noise differences remains zero, ensuring that accurate gradient aggregation is unaffected and the model accuracy remains intact. We theoretically prove that the privacy-preserving capacity of LPPA is \sqrt{2} times greater than that of noise addition, while maintaining comparable model accuracy to the standard DFL aggregation without noise injection. Experimental results verify the theoretical findings and show that LPPA achieves a 14% mean improvement in accuracy over noise addition. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of LPPA in protecting raw data and guaranteeing lossless model accuracy.

Decentralized federated learning (DFL) is inherently vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, as malicious clients can transmit manipulated gradients to neighboring clients. Existing defense methods either reject suspicious gradients per iteration or restart DFL aggregation after excluding all malicious clients. They all neglect the potential benefits that may exist within contributions from malicious clients. In this paper, we propose a novel gradient purification defense, termed GPD, to defend against data poisoning attacks in DFL. It aims to separately mitigate the harm in gradients and retain benefits embedded in model weights, thereby enhancing overall model accuracy. For each benign client in GPD, a recording variable is designed to track historically aggregated gradients from one of its neighbors. It allows benign clients to precisely detect malicious neighbors and mitigate all aggregated malicious gradients at once. Upon mitigation, benign clients optimize model weights using purified gradients. This optimization not only retains previously beneficial components from malicious clients but also exploits canonical contributions from benign clients. We analyze the convergence of GPD, as well as its ability to harvest high accuracy. Extensive experiments demonstrate that, GPD is capable of mitigating data poisoning attacks under both iid and non-iid data distributions. It also significantly outperforms state-of-the-art defense methods in terms of model accuracy.