Jun Jia

Multimodal image fusion enables precise lesion localization and characterization for accurate diagnosis, thereby strengthening clinical decision-making and driving its growing prominence in medical imaging research. A powerful multimodal image fusion model relies on high-quality, clinically representative multimodal training data and a rigorously engineered model architecture. Therefore, the development of such professional radiomics models represents a collaborative achievement grounded in standardized acquisition, clinical-specific expertise, and algorithmic design proficiency, which necessitates protection of associated intellectual property rights. However, current multimodal image fusion models generate fused outputs without built-in mechanisms to safeguard intellectual property rights, inadvertently exposing proprietary model knowledge and sensitive training data through inference leakage. For example, malicious users can exploit fusion outputs and model distillation or other inference-based reverse engineering techniques to approximate the fusion performance of proprietary models. To address this issue, we propose AMIF, the first Authorizable Medical Image Fusion model with built-in authentication, which integrates authorization access control into the image fusion objective. For unauthorized usage, AMIF embeds explicit and visible copyright identifiers into fusion results. In contrast, high-quality fusion results are accessible upon successful key-based authentication.

Recent advances in visual-language alignment have endowed vision-language models (VLMs) with fine-grained image understanding capabilities. However, this progress also introduces new privacy risks. This paper first proposes a novel privacy threat model named identity-affiliation learning: an attacker fine-tunes a VLM using only a few private photos of a target individual, thereby embedding associations between the target facial identity and their private property and social relationships into the model's internal representations. Once deployed via public APIs, this model enables unauthorized exposure of the target user's private information upon input of their photos. To benchmark VLMs' susceptibility to such identity-affiliation leakage, we introduce the first identity-affiliation dataset comprising seven typical scenarios appearing in private photos. Each scenario is instantiated with multiple identity-centered photo-description pairs. Experimental results demonstrate that mainstream VLMs like LLaVA, Qwen-VL, and MiniGPT-v2, can recognize facial identities and infer identity-affiliation relationships by fine-tuning on small-scale private photographic dataset, and even on synthetically generated datasets. To mitigate this privacy risk, we propose DP2-VL, the first Dataset Protection framework for private photos that leverages Data Poisoning. Though optimizing imperceptible perturbations by pushing the original representations toward an antithetical region, DP2-VL induces a dataset-level shift in the embedding space of VLMs'encoders. This shift separates protected images from clean inference images, causing fine-tuning on the protected set to overfit. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DP2-VL achieves strong generalization across models, robustness to diverse post-processing operations, and consistent effectiveness across varying protection ratios.